The Occupy movement has been with us for over a month, and there seems to be no way to end the deadlock. More and more people have come to the conclusion that the police will eventually have to clear the occupied sites by force. But this is unlikely to happen in the near future, so the current situation may become normalised for months to come.
The Beijing authorities, and hence the Hong Kong government, appear to have adopted the principle of "no compromise, no blood" for now, which means they are prepared to be patient and wait out the protests. Hong Kong's gross domestic product last year was only about 3 per cent of mainland China's, thus any short-to-medium-term damage to the Hong Kong economy as a consequence of its political turmoil will not hurt China as a whole.
However, Chinese officials have also repeatedly referred to the Chinese saying, "If you refuse a toast, you will be forced to drink a forfeit", which implies that the protesters and pan-democrats who want to do things the hard way are likely to find their wish granted.
The Chinese government claims comprehensive jurisdiction over the Hong Kong special administrative region. If needed, it will not hesitate to abandon its previous policy of granting special favours and concessions to Hong Kong, and quicken its implementation of a plan to develop Shanghai and Shenzhen into international finance centres, which will reduce Hong Kong's role in the Chinese economy. The SAR's economic significance to China has already declined over the years, and it will be further marginalised.
In the eyes of many - or even most - Chinese officials, Hong Kong is like a "spoiled child" best left to its own destiny and undeserving of more concessions and special care. Some businessmen visiting the mainland have brought back stories of Chinese officials harshly criticising Hong Kong in conversations, with some making derogatory remarks.
Meanwhile, some Hong Kong officials have told friends about the cold reception and stern faces that greeted them when they travelled up north to meet their counterparts.
The State Council has made it explicit, in its white paper published in June, that China's sovereignty, security and development interests take precedence over Hong Kong's stability and prosperity. This implies that the latter can be sacrificed in order to safeguard the former. As things stand, there is no immediate need for the authorities to clamp down on the protests, as long as national priorities are not threatened.
On the streets, however, the protesters have firmly entrenched themselves. Repeated opinion surveys and media interviews have reaffirmed their great determination to stay put and defend the sites, in the vague hope of gaining some ground towards "genuine universal suffrage". It is the people in the occupied zones who have been refusing to evacuate, forcing the leaders of the Federation of Students to go along with them.
When the student leaders brought back for consultation the government's suggestions on submitting an opinion report to Beijing and setting up a multiparty platform, it was the masses in occupied Admiralty who flatly rejected the offers.
All along, the more radical protesters have been influential. By now, representatives of these small, radical organisations have successfully gained admission into the protesters' top decision-making core group, comprising leaders of the Federation of Students, Scholarism and the original Occupy Central, in descending order of their influence.
The Occupy leaders have been racking their brains to come up with one idea after another on what to do next, including meeting with central government officials, going up to Beijing during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit meeting, and triggering a de facto city-wide referendum with the resignation of one (or five) pan-democratic legislators. All these ideas appear whimsical or impractical in solving the deadlock. And, each time, the Occupy protesters stressed that these ideas would not pave the way to voluntary evacuation.
Meanwhile, the Admiralty occupied zone has grown into a self-sufficient community, with voluntary division of labour among the masses who set up and manage the barricades, tents, resource centres, clinics, study corners and art exhibits. It has been reported that the resource centres have ample supplies to last the coming winter, and more are pouring in.
The sustainability of this community is ensured by the free movement of its inhabitants, who take turns to go back to their own home for a good rest and better food. In the daytime, there are often only several dozen protesters at Admiralty to keep watch for government clearance actions, while many others go to college or work, returning in the evenings and on public holidays.
Most important of all, the inhabitants have developed among themselves a spirit of comradeship, an attachment to the territories they "possess", and an identity of the community they have collectively built. Any clearance action by the government or the anti-Occupy forces will be perceived as an encroachment upon their "rights" to their "home village".
Meanwhile, the Hong Kong government and people have reluctantly and grudgingly found ways to adapt to this normalisation of the Occupy movement. But the longer the occupation goes on, the bigger the chance people may get seriously hurt, for example through arson, violent fighting, or even a bomb explosion. Any such event could spark off riots, leading to harsh police repression.
Without a breakthrough, the "Hong Kong commune" at Admiralty is likely to stay with us well into 2015.
Andrew Fung is chief executive officer at the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute
